Most of us are sure that, whatever the mind is, our ability to know has fairly set and dependable limits, imposed by the nature on our senses and their ability to perceive the world around us.

But how can we be sure? Perhaps living in a scientific age has lulled us into a false sense of certainty about things that cannot, after all, be weighed or measured. However sure most scientists seem to be about the definable limits of the mind, a flash of doubt flares up every now and then which throws the light of question on rational self-assurance. Twice (notably) this has happened in an age of science, once in the eighteenth century and once in our own. Each time the question has been directed not chiefly at the nature of the mind, but at the relationship between reality and our senses as avenues of knowledge.

Partly on grounds of philosophy and partly of theology, the eighteenth century bishop, George Berkeley, directly challenged Locke. The mind, said Berkeley, is not a recording machine but a reflection of the only definite reality, the Spirit. For him “there is not any other Substance than Spirit,” and all the things we see, hear, taste, touch, and smell represent no external reality whose existence can surely be demonstrated.

1. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colors with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance; and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odors; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain color, taste, smell, figure, and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name “apple”; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things; which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.

2. But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.

3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what every body will allow. And to me it seems no less evident that the various
sensations or ideas imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term “exist,” when applied to sensible things. The table I write on, I say, exists; that is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odor, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this Principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?

5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet, it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colors, heat and cold, extension and figures — in a word the things we see and feel — what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may indeed divide in my thoughts or conceive apart from each other those things which, perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far I will not deny I can abstract; if that may properly be called “abstraction,” which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it.

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind; that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the absurdity of abstraction to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.

7. From what has been said it is evident there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives . . .
18. But though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist without
the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know
this? Either we must know it by Sense, or by Reason. As for our senses, by them we have the
knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by
sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or
unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge.
— It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by
reason inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But (I do not
see) what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what
we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary
connection betwixt them and our ideas. I say, it is granted on all hands (and what happens in
dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected
with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed without, resembling them. Hence it is
evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it
is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, in the same
order we see them in at present, without their concurrence.

19. But though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may
be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production by supposing external
bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such
things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said. For though we
give the materialists their external bodies, they, by their own confession, are never the nearer
knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what
manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind.
Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we
should suppose

Matter or corporeal substances; since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable
with or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the
mind, yet to hold they do so must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose,
without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and
serve to no manner of purpose.

20. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it;
and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have
now. Suppose — what no one can deny possible — an intelligence, without the help of external
bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the
same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence has not all the
reason to believe the existence of Corporeal Substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting
them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this there can
be no question. Which one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person suspect
the strength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have for the existence of bodies
without the mind . . .

25. All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names
they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive: there is nothing of power or agency included in
them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce, or make any alteration in another.
To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our
ideas. For since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is
nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense
or reflection, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is therefore no such thing
contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it; insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do any thing, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of any thing: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being . . . Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure and motion, cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.

26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas; some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is, therefore, some cause of these ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section.

It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit . . .

29. But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my views: and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.

30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series — the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules or established methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called the laws of nature; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things . . .

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called real things: and those excited in the imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas: that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful Spirit: yet still they are ideas, and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.

FOR ANALYSIS

1. Part 1 presents three ways in which ideas are formed. Does each method seem valid to you? Can you think of more?

2. Part 1 states that “collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book.” Can you suggest what “ideas” are grouped to constitute a stone? tree? book?

3. How, according to Berkeley, do we perceive the existence of any sensible thing, such as a table? According to his definition can a table actually be said to exist?

4. In Part 18 Berkeley writes, “I say . . . that it is possible we might be affected with all the
ideas we have now, though no bodies existed without, resembling them.” What reasoning
does he use to support this statement?

5. The source of all our perceptions, says Berkeley, is a “substance or Spirit.” What does he
mean? What specific example can you offer to support this statement?

6. The ideas imprinted on my senses, says Berkeley, in Part 29, “are not creatures of my
will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.” On the basis of this
statement, what would you say is Bishop Berkeley’s main purpose in writing this essay?

7. Berkeley concludes that “the reader need only reflect and try to separate in his own
thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.” This is a sentence typical
of philosophical writing. Can you restate it in your own language and explain what it
means?

8. What is Berkeley’s attitude in this essay toward material things? How does it compare with
your own?

9. What insights does your answer to question 8 give you into Berkeley’s age and your own?

FOR DISCUSSION

Suppose there were an apple in the room next door to you that was not perceived by any mind.
According to Berkeley, would it exist? Can you disprove Berkeley’s point of view?